

Chapter 10

Launching the New Ship of State

1789–1800

I shall only say that I hold with Montesquieu, that a government must be fitted to a nation, as much as a coat to the individual; and, consequently, that what may be good at Philadelphia may be bad at Paris, and ridiculous at Petersburg [Russia].

ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 1799

America's new ship of state did not spread its sails to the most favorable breezes. Within twelve troubled years, the American people had risen up and thrown overboard both the British yoke and the Articles of Confederation. A decade of lawbreaking and constitution smashing was not the best training for government making. Americans had come to regard a central authority, replacing that of George III, as a necessary evil—something to be distrusted, watched, and curbed.

The finances of the infant government were likewise precarious. The revenue had declined to a trickle, whereas the public debt, with interest heavily in arrears, was mountainous. Worthless paper money, both state and national, was as plentiful as metallic money was scarce. America's precarious national security was also threatened by the wars that rocked Europe in the wake of the French Revolution of 1789—an event that also roiled domestic politics in the fledgling United States. In the face of all those difficulties, the Americans were brashly trying to erect a republic on an immense scale, something that no other people had attempted and that traditional political theory deemed impossible. The eyes of a skeptical world were on the upstart United States.

Even after the battles over adoption of the Constitution, conflict continued to rage about the nature of government. Some, such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, supported a limited government. Others, such as George Washington and Alexander Hamilton,

hoped to extend the powers of the government in order to create institutions that could strengthen the new country. The political fights of the Washington and Adams years made for a contentious start to the early Republic.

★ Growing Pains

When the Constitution was launched in 1789, the Republic was continuing to grow at an amazing rate. Population was doubling about every twenty-five years, and the first official census of 1790 recorded almost 4 million people. Cities had blossomed proportionately: Philadelphia numbered 42,000, New York 33,000, Boston 18,000, Charleston 16,000, and Baltimore 13,000.

The French statesman Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727–1781) had high expectations for a united America:

“This people is the hope of the human race. . . . The Americans should be an example of political, religious, commercial and industrial liberty. . . . But to obtain these ends for us, America . . . must not become . . . a mass of divided powers, contending for territory and trade.”

America's population was still about 90 percent rural, despite the flourishing cities. All but 5 percent of the people lived east of the Appalachian Mountains. The trans-Appalachian overflow was concentrated chiefly in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio, all of which were welcomed as states within fourteen years. (Vermont preceded them, becoming the fourteenth state in 1791.) Foreign visitors to America looked down their noses at the roughness and crudity resulting from ax-and-rifle pioneering life.

People of the western waters—in the stump-studded clearings of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio—were particularly restive and dubiously loyal. The mouth of the Mississippi, their life-giving outlet, lay in the hands of unfriendly Spaniards. Smooth-talking Spanish and British agents, jingling gold, moved freely among the settlers and held out seductive promises of independence. Many observers wondered whether the emerging United States would ever grow to maturity.


★ Washington for President

George Washington, the esteemed war hero, was unanimously drafted as president by the Electoral College in 1789—the only presidential nominee ever to be honored by unanimity. His presence was imposing: 6 feet 2 inches, 175 pounds, broad and sloping shoulders, strongly pointed chin, and pockmarks (from smallpox) on nose and cheeks. Much preferring the quiet of Mount Vernon to the turmoil of politics, he was perhaps the only president who did not in some way angle for this exalted office. Balanced rather than brilliant, he commanded his followers by strength of character rather than by the arts of the politician.

Washington's long journey from Mount Vernon to New York City, the temporary capital, was a triumphal procession. He was greeted by roaring cannon, pealing bells, flower-carpeted roads, and singing and shouting citizens. With appropriate ceremony, he solemnly and somewhat nervously took the oath of office on April 30, 1789, on a crowded balcony overlooking Wall Street, which some have regarded as a bad omen.

Washington soon put his stamp on the new government, especially by establishing the cabinet. The Constitution does not mention a cabinet (see Table 10.1); it merely provides that the president “may require” written opinions of the heads of the executive-branch departments (see Art. II, Sec. II, para. 1 in the Appendix). But this system proved so cumbersome, and involved so much homework, that cabinet meetings gradually evolved in the Washington administration.

At first only three full-fledged department heads served under the president: Secretary of State Thomas



Washington Honored This idealized portrait symbolizes the reverential awe in which Americans held “the Father of His Country.”

Jefferson, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, and Secretary of War Henry Knox.

★ The Bill of Rights

The new nation faced some unfinished business. Many antifederalists had sharply criticized the Constitution drafted at Philadelphia for its failure to provide guarantees of individual rights such as freedom of religion and trial by jury. Many states had ratified the federal Constitution on the understanding that it would soon be amended to include such guarantees. Drawing up a bill of rights headed the list of imperatives facing the new government.

Amendments to the Constitution could be proposed in either of two ways—by a new constitutional convention requested by two-thirds of the states or by a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress. Fearing that a new convention might unravel the narrow federalist victory in the ratification struggle, James Madison determined to draft the amendments himself. He then guided them through Congress, where his intellectual

TABLE 10.1 Evolution of the Cabinet

Position	Date Established	Comments
Secretary of state	1789	
Secretary of treasury	1789	
Secretary of war	1789	Loses cabinet status, 1947
Attorney general	1789	Not head of Justice Dept. until 1870
Secretary of navy	1798	Loses cabinet status, 1947
Postmaster general	1829	Loses cabinet status, 1970
Secretary of interior	1849	
Secretary of agriculture	1889	
Secretary of commerce and labor	1903	Office divided, 1913
Secretary of commerce	1913	
Secretary of labor	1913	
Secretary of defense	1947	Subordinate to this secretary, without cabinet rank, are secretaries of army, navy, and air force
Secretary of health, education, and welfare	1953	Office divided, 1979
Secretary of housing and urban development	1965	
Secretary of transportation	1966	
Secretary of energy	1977	
Secretary of health and human services	1979	
Secretary of education	1979	
Secretary of veterans' affairs	1989	
Secretary of homeland security	2002	

and political skills were quickly making him the leading figure.

Adopted by the necessary number of states in 1791, the first ten amendments to the Constitution, popularly known as the **Bill of Rights**, safeguard some of the most precious American principles. Among these are protections for freedom of religion, speech, and the press; the right to bear arms and to be tried by a jury; and the right to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The Bill of Rights also prohibits cruel and unusual punishments and arbitrary government seizure of private property.

To guard against the danger that enumerating such rights might lead to the conclusion that they were the only ones protected, Madison inserted the crucial Ninth Amendment. It declares that specifying certain rights “shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” In a gesture of reassurance to the states’ righters, he included the equally significant Tenth Amendment, which reserves all rights not explicitly delegated or prohibited by the federal Constitution “to the States respectively, or to the people.”

By preserving a strong central government while specifying protections for minority and individual liberties, Madison’s amendments partially swung the federalist pendulum back in an antifederalist direction. (See Amendments I–X.)

The first Congress also nailed other newly sawed government planks into place. It created effective federal courts under the **Judiciary Act of 1789**. The act organized the Supreme Court, with a chief justice and five associates, as well as federal district and circuit courts, and established the office of attorney general. New Yorker John Jay, Madison’s collaborator on *The Federalist* papers and one of the young Republic’s most seasoned diplomats, became the first chief justice of the United States.

Hamilton Revives the Corpse of Public Credit

The key figure in the new government was still smooth-faced Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, a native of

the British West Indies. Hamilton's genius was unquestioned, but critics claimed he loved his adopted country more than he loved his countrymen. Doubts about his character and his loyalty to the republican experiment always swirled about his head. Hamilton regarded himself as a kind of prime minister in Washington's cabinet and on occasion thrust his hands into the affairs of other departments, including that of his archrival, Thomas Jefferson, who served as secretary of state.

A financial wizard, Hamilton set out immediately to correct the economic vexations that had crippled the Articles of Confederation. His plan was to shape the fiscal policies of the administration in such a way as to favor the wealthier groups. They, in turn, would gratefully lend the government monetary and political support. The new federal regime would thrive, the propertied classes would fatten, and prosperity would trickle down to the masses.

The youthful financier's first objective was to bolster the national credit. Without public confidence in the government, Hamilton could not secure the funds with which to float his risky schemes. He therefore boldly urged Congress to "fund" the entire national debt "at par" and to assume completely the debts incurred by the states during the recent war.


Funding at par meant that the federal government would pay off its debts at face value, plus accumulated interest—a then-enormous total of more than \$54 million. So many people believed the infant Treasury incapable of meeting those obligations that government bonds had depreciated to ten or fifteen cents on the dollar. Yet speculators held fistfuls of them, and when Congress passed Hamilton's measure in 1790, they grabbed for more. Some of them galloped into rural areas ahead of the news, buying for a song the depreciated paper holdings of farmers, war veterans, and widows.

Hamilton was willing, even eager, to have the new government shoulder additional obligations. While pushing the funding scheme, he urged Congress to assume the debts of the states, totaling some \$21.5 million.

The secretary made a convincing case for **assumption**. The state debts could be regarded as a proper national obligation, for they had been incurred in the war for independence. But foremost in Hamilton's thinking was the belief that assumption would chain the states more tightly to the "federal chariot." Thus the secretary's maneuver would shift the attachment of wealthy creditors from the states to the federal government. The support of the rich for the national administration was a crucial link in Hamilton's political strategy of strengthening the central government.

States burdened with heavy debts, like Massachusetts, were delighted by Hamilton's proposal. States

The Granger Collection, New York



Alexander Hamilton (1755–1804), by John Trumbull, 1792 He was one of the youngest and most brilliant of the Founding Fathers, who might have been president but for his ultraconservatism, a scandalous adultery, and a duelist's bullet. Hamilton favored a strong central government with a weak legislature to unify the infant nation and encourage industry. His chief rival, Thomas Jefferson, who extolled states' rights as a bulwark of liberty and thought the United States should remain an agricultural society, regarded Hamilton as a monarchist plotter and never forgave him for insisting that "the British Govt. was the best in the world: and that he doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in America."

with small debts, like Virginia, were less charmed. The stage was set for some old-fashioned horse trading. Virginia did not want the state debts assumed, but it did want the forthcoming federal district*—now the District of Columbia—to be located on the Potomac River. It would thus gain in commerce and prestige. Hamilton persuaded a reluctant Jefferson, who had recently come home from France, to line up enough votes in Congress for assumption. In return, Virginia would have the federal district on the Potomac. The bargain was carried through in 1790.

*Authorized by the Constitution, Art. I, Sec. VIII, para. 17.

★ Customs Duties and Excise Taxes

The new ship of state thus set sail dangerously overloaded. The national debt had swelled to \$75 million owing to Hamilton's insistence on honoring the outstanding federal and state obligations alike. Anyone less determined to establish such a healthy public credit could have sidestepped \$13 million in back interest and could have avoided the state debts entirely.

But Hamilton, “Father of the National Debt,” was not greatly worried. His objectives were as much political as economic. He believed that within limits, a national debt was a “national blessing”—a kind of Union adhesive. The more creditors to whom the government owed money, the more people there would be with a personal stake in the success of his ambitious enterprise. His unique contribution was to make a debt—ordinarily a liability—an asset for vitalizing the financial system as well as the government itself (see Figure 10.1).

Where was the money to come from to pay interest on this huge debt and run the government? Hamilton's first answer was customs duties, derived from a tariff. Tariff revenues, in turn, depended on a vigorous foreign trade, another crucial link in Hamilton's overall economic strategy for the new Republic.

The first **tariff** law, imposing a low tariff of about 8 percent on the value of dutiable imports, was speedily passed by the first Congress in 1789, even before Hamilton was sworn in. Revenue was by far the main goal, but the measure was also designed to erect a low protective wall around infant industries, which bawled noisily for more shelter than they received. Hamilton had the vision to see that the Industrial Revolution would soon reach America, and he argued strongly in favor of more protection for the well-to-do manufacturing groups—another vital element in his economic program. But Congress was still dominated by the agricultural and commercial interests, and it voted only two slight increases in the tariff during Washington's presidency.

Hamilton, with characteristic vigor, sought additional internal revenue and in 1791 secured from Congress an **excise tax** on a few domestic items, notably




FIGURE 10.1 Hamilton's Financial Structure Supported by Revenues

whiskey. The new levy of seven cents a gallon was borne chiefly by the distillers who lived in the backcountry, where the wretched roads forced the farmer to reduce (and liquefy) bulky bushels of grain to horseback proportions. Whiskey flowed so freely on the frontier in the form of distilled liquor that it was used for money.

★ Hamilton Battles Jefferson for a Bank

As the capstone for his financial system, Hamilton proposed a bank of the United States. An enthusiastic admirer of most things English, he took as his model the Bank of England. Specifically, he proposed a powerful private institution, of which the government would be the major stockholder and in which the federal Treasury would deposit its surplus monies. The central government not only would have a convenient strongbox, but federal funds would stimulate business by remaining in circulation. The bank would also print urgently needed paper money and thus provide a sound and stable national currency, badly needed since the days when the Continental dollar was “not worth a Continental.” The proposed bank would indeed be useful. But was it constitutional?

Jefferson, whose written opinion on this question Washington requested, argued vehemently against the bank. There was, he insisted, no specific authorization in the Constitution for such a financial octopus. He was convinced that all powers not specifically granted to the central government were reserved to the states, as provided in the about-to-be-ratified Bill of Rights (see Amendment X). He therefore concluded that the states, not Congress, had the power to charter banks. Believing that the Constitution should be interpreted “literally”

One of the most eloquent tributes to Hamilton's apparent miracle working came from Daniel Webster (1782–1852) in the Senate (1831):

“He smote the rock of the national resources, and abundant streams of revenue gushed forth. He touched the dead corpse of public credit, and it sprung upon its feet.”



The Whiskey Boys The cartoonist clearly favored the Pennsylvania rebels who resisted Hamilton's imposition of an excise tax on whiskey.

or "strictly," Jefferson and his states' rights disciples zealously embraced the theory of "strict construction."

Hamilton, also at Washington's request, prepared a brilliantly reasoned reply to Jefferson's arguments. Hamilton in general believed that what the Constitution did not forbid it permitted; Jefferson, in contrast, generally believed that what it did not permit it forbade. Hamilton boldly invoked the clause of the Constitution that stipulates that Congress may pass any laws "necessary and proper" to carry out the powers vested in the various government agencies (see Art. I, Sec. VIII, para. 18). The government was explicitly empowered to collect taxes and regulate trade. In carrying out these basic functions, Hamilton argued, a national bank would be not only "proper" but "necessary." By inference or implication—that is, by virtue of "implied powers"—Congress would be fully justified in establishing the Bank of the United States. In short, Hamilton contended for a "loose" or "broad" interpretation of the Constitution. He and his federalist followers thus evolved the theory of "loose construction" by invoking the "elastic clause" of the Constitution—a precedent for enormous federal powers.

Hamilton's financial views prevailed. His eloquent and realistic arguments were accepted by Washington, who reluctantly signed the bank measure into law. This explosive issue had been debated with much heat in Congress, where the old North-South cleavage still lurked ominously. The most enthusiastic support for the bank naturally came from the commercial and financial centers of the North, whereas the strongest opposition arose from the agricultural South.

The **Bank of the United States**, as created by Congress in 1791, was chartered for twenty years. Located in Philadelphia, it was to have a capital of \$10 million, one-fifth of it owned by the federal government. Stock was thrown open to public sale. To the

agreeable surprise of Hamilton, a milling crowd oversubscribed in less than two hours, pushing aside many would-be purchasers.

★ Mutinous Moonshiners in Pennsylvania

The **Whiskey Rebellion**, which flared up in southwestern Pennsylvania in 1794, sharply challenged the new national government. Hamilton's high excise tax bore harshly on these homespun pioneer folk. They regarded it not as a tax on a frivolous luxury but as a burden on an economic necessity and a medium of exchange. Even preachers of the gospel were paid in "Old Monongahela rye." Rye and corn crops distilled into alcohol were more cheaply transported to eastern markets than bales of grain. Defiant distillers finally erected whiskey poles, similar to the liberty poles of anti-stamp tax days in 1765, and raised the cry "Liberty and No Excise." Boldly tarring and feathering revenue officers, they brought collections to a halt.

President Washington, once a revolutionary, was alarmed by what he called these "self-created societies." With the hearty encouragement of Hamilton, he summoned the militias of several states. Anxious moments followed the call, for there was much doubt as to whether men in other states would muster to crush a rebellion in a fellow state. Despite some opposition, an army of about thirteen thousand rallied to the colors, and two widely separated columns marched briskly forth in a gorgeous, leaf-tinted Indian summer, until knee-deep mud slowed their progress.

When the troops reached the hills of western Pennsylvania, they found no insurrection. The "Whiskey Boys" were overawed, dispersed, or captured. Washington, with an eye to healing old sores, pardoned the two small-fry convicted culprits.

Attorney Hugh Henry Brackenridge (1748–1816) mediated between the Whiskey Rebels and the town of Pittsburgh. He later wrote of the hated excise tax,

“I saw the operation to be unequal in this country. . . . It is true that the excise paid by the country would be that only on spirits consumed in it. But even in the case of exports, the excise must be advanced in the first instance by the distiller and this would prevent effectually all the poorer part from carrying on the business. I . . . would have preferred a direct tax with a view to reach unsettled lands which all around us have been purchased by speculating men.”

The Whiskey Rebellion was minuscule—some three rebels were killed—but its consequences were mighty. George Washington’s government, now substantially strengthened, commanded a new respect. Yet the foes of the administration condemned its brutal display of force—for having used a sledgehammer to crush a gnat.

★ The Emergence of Political Parties

Almost overnight, Hamilton’s fiscal feats had established the government’s sound credit rating. The Treasury could now borrow needed funds in the Netherlands on favorable terms.

But Hamilton’s financial successes—funding, assumption, the excise tax, the bank, the suppression of the Whiskey Rebellion—created some political liabilities. All these schemes encroached sharply upon states’ rights. Many Americans, dubious about the new Constitution in the first place, might never have approved it if they had foreseen how the states were going to be overshadowed by the federal colossus. Now, out of resentment against Hamilton’s revenue-raising and centralizing policies, an organized opposition began to build. What once was a personal feud between Hamilton and Jefferson developed into a full-blown and frequently bitter political rivalry.


National political parties, in the modern sense, were unknown in America when George Washing-

ton took his inaugural oath. There had been Whigs and Tories, federalists and antifederalists, but these groups were factions rather than parties. They had sprung into existence over hotly contested special issues; they had faded away when their cause had triumphed or fizzled.


The Founders at Philadelphia had not envisioned the existence of permanent political parties. Organized opposition to the government—especially a democratic government based on popular consent—seemed tainted by disloyalty. Opposition to the government affronted the spirit of national unity that the glorious cause of the Revolution had inspired. The notion of a formal party apparatus was thus a novelty in the 1790s, and when Jefferson and Madison first organized their opposition to the Hamiltonian program, they confined their activities to Congress and did not anticipate creating a long-lived and popular party. But as their antagonism to Hamilton stiffened, and as the amazingly boisterous and widely read newspapers of the day spread their political message, and Hamilton’s, among the people, primitive semblances of political parties began to emerge.

The two-party system has existed in the United States since that time (see Table 10.2). Ironically, in light of early suspicions about the very legitimacy of parties, their competition for power has actually proved to be among the indispensable ingredients of a sound democracy. The party out of power—“the loyal opposition”—traditionally plays the invaluable role of the balance wheel on the machinery of government, ensuring that politics never drifts too far out of kilter with the wishes of the people.

TABLE 10.2 Evolution of Major Parties*



*See the Appendix (Presidential Elections) for third parties.



Erich Lessing/Art Resource, NY

The Execution of Queen Marie Antoinette, 1793 The bloody excesses of the notorious guillotine disgusted many Americans and soured them on the promises of the French Revolution.

★ The Impact of the French Revolution

When Washington's first administration ended in early 1793, Hamilton's domestic policies had already stimulated the formation of two political camps—Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans and Hamiltonian Federalists. As Washington's second term began, foreign-policy issues brought the differences between them to a fever pitch.

Only a few weeks after Washington's inauguration in 1789, the curtain had risen on the first act of the French Revolution. (See “Thinking Globally: Two Revolutions,” pp. 188–189.) Twenty-six years were to pass before the seething continent of Europe collapsed into a peace of exhaustion. Few non-American events have left a deeper scar on American political and social life. In a sense the French Revolution was misnamed: it was a historic, global revolution that sent tremors through much of the Western world and beyond.

In its early stages, the upheaval was surprisingly peaceful, involving as it did a successful attempt to impose constitutional shackles on Louis XVI. The American people, loving liberty and deploring despotism, cheered. They were flattered to think that the outburst in France was but the second chapter of their own glorious Revolution, as to some extent it was. Only a few ultraconservative Federalists—fearing change,

reform, and “leveling” principles—were from the outset dubious or outspokenly hostile to the “despicable mobocracy.” The more ardent Jeffersonians were overjoyed.

The French Revolution entered a more ominous phase in 1792, when France declared war on hostile Austria. Powerful ideals and powerful armies alike were on the march. Late in that year, the electrifying news reached America that French citizen armies had hurled back the invading foreigners and that France had proclaimed itself a republic. Americans enthusiastically sang “The Marseillaise” and other rousing French

British political observer William Cobbett (1763–1835) wrote of the frenzied reaction in America to the death of Louis XVI,

“Never was the memory of a man so cruelly insulted as that of this mild and humane monarch. He was guillotined in effigy, in the capital of the Union [Philadelphia], twenty or thirty times every day, during one whole winter and part of the summer. Men, women and children flocked to the tragical exhibition, and not a single paragraph appeared in the papers to shame them from it.”

Two Revolutions

On July 14, 1789, a howling mob stormed the Bastille—a dank Parisian prison described by the Marquis de Lafayette as France’s “fortress of despotism”—killed half a dozen soldiers, and paraded the severed heads of its commanding officer and the mayor of Paris throughout the city. The French Revolution was thus bloodily launched. Bastille Day is still celebrated as France’s national birthday, just as Americans celebrate the Fourth of July.

The roots of the two Revolutions were thickly intertwined. To defray the cost of the war that had ousted France from North America in 1763, Britain had levied new taxes on its colonists, provoking them to revolt in 1776. In turn, aiding the rebellious Americans forced the French government to seek new revenues, lighting the fuse that led to the political explosion in Paris in 1789.

Even more notable was the intellectual commonality between the upheavals. The ideas that inspired the American and French revolutionaries grew from the common heritage of radical eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinking about equality, freedom, and the sovereignty of the people. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789) deliberately echoed Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence (1776) when it said that “men are born and remain free and equal in rights,” among which were “liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.” Many French thinkers openly credited the American Revolution as the inspiration for their own. As the American revolutionary Thomas Paine remarked to George Washington, “The principles of America opened the Bastille.” Indeed, in many ways the French were even more radi-

cal than the Americans; their Revolution abolished slavery (temporarily), something the Americans failed to do for almost one hundred years more.

And yet the American and French Revolutions unfolded in dramatically different ways and left vastly different legacies. The Americans largely disarmed after winning their independence; allowed some eighty thousand hard-core Loyalists to depart without suffering grievous retribution (see “Makers of America: The Loyalists,” pp. 140–141); peacefully resumed their habits of worship, toil, and governance; and proceeded to draft the U.S. Constitution, under which they have lived, with amendments, for more than two centuries. The American revolutionaries, in short, secured the fruits of their Revolution fairly easily, while the French struggled through ghastly bloodshed to ultimate failure—an



Réunion des Musées Nationaux/Art Resource, NY

Storming the Bastille, 1789 This event signaled the outbreak of the French Revolution.

outcome that haunted European politics for at least a century thereafter.

Revolutionaries in France had to grapple with the constant threats of counterrevolution at home and armed intervention from abroad. As a result, they soon descended into grisly violence, including the execution of some forty thousand Frenchmen in the notorious Reign of Terror of 1793–1794, the guillotining of the king and queen, and preemptive attacks on neighboring countries. They stripped the Catholic Church of its property and privileges, briefly experimented with a new state religion called the Cult of Reason, and eventually conceded supreme power to a brash young general, Napoleon Bonaparte, who convulsed all of Europe in the name of “liberty, equality, and fraternity.” Napoleon was finally defeated at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, after which the Bourbon monarchy was restored to the throne.

Why did these two great eruptions, sprung from a shared chain of events and espousing almost identical political philosophies, fare so differently? Many scholars have found the answer in the countries’ markedly different pre-Revolutionary histories. France’s Revolution confronted implacably entrenched adversaries in the landed nobility and the clergy. Those two “estates,” as they were called, clung tenaciously to their ancient privileges, as did the princes and potentates who ruled in all the countries on France’s borders. To succeed, the French Revolution had to concentrate power in the hands of a state powerful enough to extinguish its internal enemies and to forestall foreign intervention as well. Those stark necessities help account for the fact that down to the present day, central governments are stronger in almost all European societies than in the United States.

The Americans faced no such obstacles. They had no aristocracy worthy of the name, no church with the kind of influence that the Catholic Church commanded in France, and no menacing neighbors to fear. They had the

luxury of being able to focus on limiting the power of the state, not enlarging it. Theirs was largely a *colonial* conflict, whereas France had to endure a *class* conflict. Not until Reconstruction following the Civil War would Americans confront a comparable task of mustering sufficient power to uproot and permanently extinguish an entire social order.

It has been said that to mount a revolution is “to murder and create.” What was exceptional about the Ameri-

can revolutionaries was that they were spared the necessity to murder. The American Revolution grew not from abstract ideas, but from the preceding two centuries of American experience. It was less a revolution in the usual sense than a consolidation of already well-established norms, values, and behaviors. Alexander Hamilton understood that crucial point when he wrote to the Marquis de Lafayette in 1789, “I dread the reveries of your *philosophic* politicians.”



The Key to the Bastille, Mount Vernon, Virginia The Marquis de Lafayette instructed Thomas Paine, his American Revolutionary War comrade, to deliver the key to the liberated Bastille to George Washington. It hangs to this day in the entry hall of Washington’s home at Mount Vernon, Virginia, a lasting symbol of the deep affinity between the French and American Revolutions. Mount Vernon Ladies’ Association

Revolutionary songs, and they renamed thoroughfares with democratic flair. King Street in New York, for example, became Liberty Street, and in Boston, Royal Exchange Alley became Equality Lane.

But centuries of pent-up poison could not be purged without baleful results. The guillotine was set up, the king was beheaded in 1793, the church was attacked, and the head-rolling **Reign of Terror** was begun. Back in America, God-fearing Federalist aristocrats nervously fingered their tender white necks and eyed the Jeffersonian masses apprehensively. Lukewarm Federalist approval of the early Revolution turned, almost overnight, to heated talk of “blood-drinking cannibals.”

Sober-minded Jeffersonians regretted the bloodshed. But they felt, with Jefferson, that one could not expect to be carried from “despotism to liberty in a feather bed” and that a few thousand aristocratic heads were a cheap price to pay for human freedom.

Such approbation was shortsighted, for dire peril loomed ahead. The earlier battles of the French Revolution had not hurt America directly, but now Britain was sucked into the contagious conflict. The conflagration speedily spread to the New World, where it vividly affected the expanding young American Republic. Thus was repeated the familiar story of every major European war, beginning with 1688, that involved a watery duel for control of the Atlantic Ocean. (See Table 6.2 on p. 103.)

Washington's Neutrality Proclamation

Ominously, the Franco-American alliance of 1778 was still on the books. By its own terms, it was to last “forever.” It bound the United States to help the French defend their West Indies against future foes, and the booming British fleets were certain to attack these strategic islands.

Many Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans favored honoring the alliance. Aflame with the liberal ideals of the French Revolution, red-blooded Jeffersonians were eager to enter the conflict against Britain, the recent foe, at the side of France, the recent friend. America owed France its freedom, they argued, and now was the time to pay the debt of gratitude.

But President George Washington, levelheaded as usual, was not swayed by the clamor of the crowd. Backed by Hamilton, he believed that war had to be avoided at all costs. Washington was coolly playing for enormous stakes. The nation in 1793 was militarily feeble, economically wobbly, and politically disunited. But solid foundations were being laid, and American cradles were continuing to rock a bumper crop of babies. Washington wisely reasoned that if America could avoid the broils of Europe for a generation or so, it would then

be populous enough and powerful enough to assert its maritime rights with strength and success. Otherwise it might invite catastrophe. The strategy of delay—of playing for time while the birthrate fought America's battles—was a cardinal policy of the Founding Fathers. It was based on a shrewd assessment of American strengths and weaknesses at this critical moment in the young Republic's history. Hamilton and Jefferson, often poles apart on other issues, were in agreement here.

Accordingly, Washington boldly issued his **Neutrality Proclamation** in 1793, shortly after the outbreak of war between Britain and France. This epochal document not only proclaimed the government's official neutrality in the widening conflict but also sternly warned American citizens to be impartial toward both armed camps. As America's first formal declaration of aloofness from Old World quarrels, Washington's Neutrality Proclamation proved to be a major prop of the spreading isolationist tradition. It also proved to be enormously controversial. The pro-French Jeffersonians were enraged by the Neutrality Proclamation, especially by Washington's method of announcing it unilaterally, without consulting Congress. The pro-British Federalists were heartened.

Debate soon intensified. An impetuous, thirty-year-old representative of the French Republic, Citizen Edmond Genêt, had landed at Charleston, South Carolina. With unrestrained zeal he undertook to fit out privateers and otherwise take advantage of the existing Franco-American alliance. The giddy-headed envoy—all sail and no anchor—was soon swept away by his enthusiastic reception by the Jeffersonian Republicans. He foolishly came to believe that the Neutrality Proclamation did not reflect the true wishes of the American people, and he consequently embarked upon unneutral activity not authorized by the French alliance—including the recruitment of armies to invade Spanish Florida and Louisiana, as well as British Canada. Even Madison and Jefferson were soon disillusioned by his conduct. After he threatened to appeal over the head of “Old Washington” to the sovereign voters, the president demanded Genêt's withdrawal, and the Frenchman was replaced by a less impulsive emissary.

Washington's Neutrality Proclamation clearly illustrates the truism that self-interest is the basic cement of alliances. In 1778 both France and America stood to gain; in 1793 only France. Technically, the Americans did not flout their obligation because France never officially called upon them to honor it. American neutrality in fact favored France. The French West Indies urgently needed Yankee foodstuffs. If the Americans had entered the war at France's side, the British fleets would have blockaded the American coast and cut off those essential supplies. America was thus much more useful to France as a reliable neutral provider than as a blockaded partner-in-arms.



MAP 10.1 American Posts Held by the British and British-American Clashes After 1783 © Cengage Learning

✦ Embroilments with Britain

President Washington's far-visions policy of neutrality was sorely tried by the British. For ten long years, they had been retaining the chain of northern frontier posts on U.S. soil, all in defiance of the peace treaty of 1783 (see Map 10.1). The London government was reluctant to abandon the lucrative fur trade in the Great Lakes region and also hoped to build up an Indian buffer state to contain the ambitious Americans. British agents openly sold firearms and firewater to the Indians of the Miami Confederacy, an alliance of eight Indian nations who terrorized Americans invading their lands. Little Turtle, war chief of the Miamis, gave notice that the confederacy regarded the Ohio River as the United States' northwestern, and their own southeastern, border. In 1790 and 1791, Little Turtle's braves defeated armies led by Generals Josiah Harmar and Arthur St. Clair, killing hundreds of soldiers and handing the United States what remains one of its worst defeats in the history of the frontier.

But in 1794, when a new army under General "Mad Anthony" Wayne routed the Miamis at the **Battle of Fallen Timbers**, the British refused to shelter Indians fleeing from the battle. Abandoned when it counted by their red-coated friends, the Indians soon offered Wayne the peace pipe. In the **Treaty of Greenville**,

signed in August 1795, the confederacy gave up vast tracts of the Old Northwest, including most of present-day Indiana and Ohio. In exchange the Indians received a lump-sum payment of \$20,000, an annual annuity of \$9,000, the right to hunt the lands they had ceded, and, most important, what they hoped was recognition of their sovereign status. Although the treaty codified an unequal relationship, the Indians felt that it put some limits on the ability of the United States to decide the fate of Indian peoples.

On the sea frontier, the British were eager to starve out the French West Indies and naturally expected

Thomas Paine (1737–1809), then in France and resenting George Washington's anti-French policies, addressed the president in an open letter (1796) that reveals his bitterness:

“And as to you, sir, treacherous in private friendship (for so you have been to me, and that in the day of danger) and a hypocrite in public life, the world will be puzzled to decide, whether you are an apostate or an imposter; whether you have abandoned good principles, or whether you ever had any.”

Signing the Treaty of Greenville, 1795

Following General Wayne's victory at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794, the Miami Indians surrendered their claims to much of the Old Northwest.



Chicago History Museum

the United States to defend them under the Franco-American alliance. Hard-boiled commanders of the Royal Navy, ignoring America's rights as a neutral, struck savagely. They seized about three hundred American merchant ships in the West Indies, impressed scores of seamen into service on British vessels, and threw hundreds of others into foul dungeons.

These actions, especially impressment, incensed patriotic Americans. A mighty outcry arose, chiefly from Jeffersonians, that America should once again fight George III in defense of its liberties. At the very least, it should cut off all supplies to its oppressor through a nationwide embargo. But the Federalists stoutly resisted all demands for drastic action. Hamilton's high hopes for economic development depended on trade with Britain. War with the world's mightiest commercial empire would pierce the heart of the Hamiltonian financial system.

★ Jay's Treaty and Washington's Farewell

President Washington, in a last desperate gamble to avert war, decided to send Chief Justice John Jay to London in 1794. The Jeffersonians were acutely unhappy over the choice, partly because they feared that so notorious a Federalist and Anglophile would sell out his country. Arriving in London, Jay gave the Jeffersonians

further cause for alarm when, at the presentation ceremony, he routinely kissed the queen's hand.

Unhappily, Jay entered the negotiations with weak cards, which were further sabotaged by Hamilton. The latter, fearful of war with Britain, secretly supplied the British with the details of America's bargaining strategy. Not surprisingly, Jay won few concessions. The British did promise to evacuate the chain of posts on U.S. soil—a pledge that inspired little confidence, since it had been made before in Paris (to the same John Jay!) in 1783. In addition, Britain consented to pay damages for the recent seizures of American ships. But the British stopped short of pledging anything about *future* maritime seizures and impressments or about supplying arms to Indians. And they forced Jay to give ground by binding the United States to pay the debts still owed to British merchants on pre-Revolutionary accounts.

Jay's unpopular pact, more than any other issue, vitalized the newborn Democratic-Republican party of Thomas Jefferson. When the Jeffersonians learned of Jay's concessions, their rage was fearful to behold. The treaty seemed like an abject surrender to Britain, as well as a betrayal of the Jeffersonian South. Southern planters would have to pay the major share of the pre-Revolutionary debts, while rich Federalist shippers were collecting damages for recent British seizures. Jeffersonian mobs hanged, burned, and guillotined in effigy that "damn'd archtraitor, Sir John Jay." Even George

Washington's huge popularity was compromised by the controversy over the treaty.

Jay's Treaty had other unforeseen consequences. Fearing that the treaty foreshadowed an Anglo-American alliance, Spain moved hastily to strike a deal with the United States. **Pinckney's Treaty** of 1795 with Spain granted the Americans virtually everything they demanded, including free navigation of the Mississippi, the right of deposit (warehouse rights) at New Orleans, and the large disputed territory of western Florida. (See Map 9.3 on p. 167.)

Exhausted after the diplomatic and partisan battles of his second term, President Washington decided to retire. His choice contributed powerfully to establishing a two-term tradition for American presidents.* In his **Farewell Address** to the nation in 1796 (never delivered orally but printed in the newspapers), Washington strongly advised the avoidance of "permanent alliances" like the still-vexatious Franco-American Treaty of 1778. Contrary to general misunderstanding, Washington did not oppose all alliances, but favored only "temporary alliances" for "extraordinary emergencies." This was admirable advice for a weak and divided nation in 1796. But what is sound counsel for a young stripling may not apply later to a mature and muscular giant.

Washington's contributions as president were enormous, even though the sparkling Hamilton at times seemed to outshine him. The central government, its fiscal feet now under it, was solidly established. The West was expanding. The merchant marine was plowing the seas. Above all, Washington had kept the nation out of both overseas entanglements and foreign wars. The experimental stage had passed, and the presidential chair could now be turned over to a less impressive figure. But republics are notoriously ungrateful. When Washington left office in 1797, he was showered with the brickbats of partisan abuse, quite in contrast with the bouquets that had greeted his arrival.

★ John Adams Becomes President

Who should succeed the exalted "Father of His Country"? Alexander Hamilton was the best-known member of the Federalist party, now that Washington had bowed out. But his financial policies, some of which had fattened the speculators, had made him so unpopular that he could not hope to be elected president. The Federalists were forced to turn to Washington's vice president, the experienced but ungracious John Adams,

*Not broken until 1940 by Franklin D. Roosevelt and made a part of the Constitution in 1951 by the Twenty-second Amendment. (See the Appendix.)



Harvard Art Museum, Fogg Art Museum, Harvard University Portrait Collection, Bequest of Ward Nicholas Boylston to Harvard College, 1828, H74. Photo: Imaging Department © President and Fellows of Harvard College

John Adams, by John Singleton Copley, 1783 When he entered Harvard College in 1751, Adams intended to prepare for the ministry, but four absorbing years of study excited him about other intellectual and career possibilities: "I was a mighty metaphysician, at least I thought myself such." Adams also tried his hand at being a mighty scientist, doctor, and orator. Upon graduation he became a schoolmaster but soon decided to take up the law.

a rugged chip off old Plymouth Rock. The Democratic-Republicans naturally rallied behind their master organizer and leader, Thomas Jefferson.

Political passions ran feverishly high in the presidential campaign of 1796. The lofty presence of Washington had hitherto imposed some restraints; now the lid was off. Cultured Federalists like Fisher Ames referred to the Jeffersonians as "fire-eating salamanders, poison-sucking toads." Federalists and

Although Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826) and John Adams hardly saw eye to eye, Jefferson displayed grudging respect for Adams in a piece of private correspondence in 1787:

“He is vain, irritable, and a bad calculator of the force and probable effect of the motives which govern men. This is all the ill which can possibly be said of him. He is as disinterested as the Being who made him.”

Democratic-Republicans even drank their ale in separate taverns. The issues of the campaign, as it turned out, focused heavily on personalities. But the Jeffersonians again assailed the too-forceful crushing of the Whiskey Rebellion and, above all, the negotiation of Jay’s hated treaty.

John Adams, with most of his support in New England, squeezed through by the narrow margin of 71 votes to 68 in the Electoral College. Jefferson, as runner-up, became vice president.* One of the ablest statesmen of his day, Adams at sixty-two was a stuffy figure. Sharp-featured, bald, relatively short (five feet seven inches), and thickset (“His Rotundity”), he impressed observers as a man of stern principles who did his duty with stubborn devotion. Although learned and upright, he was a tactless and prickly intellectual aristocrat, with no appeal to the masses and with no desire to cultivate any. Many citizens regarded him with “respectful irritation.”

*The possibility of such an inharmonious two-party combination in the future was removed by the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution in 1804. (See the Appendix.)

The XYZ Affair When President Adams’s envoys to Paris were asked to pay a huge bribe as the price of doing diplomatic business, humiliated Americans rose up in wrath against France. Here an innocent young America is being plundered by Frenchmen as John Bull looks on in amusement from across the English Channel.



The Lilly Library, Indiana University

The crusty New Englander suffered from other handicaps. He had stepped into Washington’s shoes, which no successor could hope to fill. In addition, Adams was hated by Hamilton, who had resigned from the Treasury in 1795 and who now headed the war faction of the Federalist party, known as the “High Federalists.” The famed financier even secretly plotted with certain members of the cabinet against the president, who had a conspiracy rather than a cabinet on his hands. Adams regarded Hamilton as “the most ruthless, impatient, artful, indefatigable and unprincipled intriguer in the United States, if not in the world.” Most ominous of all, Adams inherited a violent quarrel with France—a quarrel whose gunpowder lacked only a spark.

★ Unofficial Fighting with France

The French were infuriated by Jay’s Treaty. They condemned it as the initial step toward an alliance with Britain, their perpetual foe. They further assailed the pact as a flagrant violation of the Franco-American Treaty of 1778. French warships, in retaliation, began to seize defenseless American merchant vessels, altogether about three hundred by mid-1797. Adding insult to outrage, the Paris regime haughtily refused to receive America’s newly appointed envoy and even threatened him with arrest.

President Adams kept his head, temporarily, even though the nation was mightily aroused. True to Washington’s policy of steering clear of war at all costs, he tried again to reach an agreement with the French and appointed a diplomatic commission of three men, including John Marshall, the future chief justice.



The Free Library of Philadelphia

Preparation for War to Defend Commerce: The Building of the Frigate *Philadelphia*

In 1803 this frigate ran onto the rocks near Tripoli harbor, and about three hundred officers and men were imprisoned by the Tripolitans (see Map 11.2 on p. 211). The ship was refloated for service against the Americans, but Stephen Decatur led a party of men that set it afire.

Adams's envoys, reaching Paris in 1797, hoped to meet with Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, the crafty French foreign minister. They were secretly approached by three go-betweens, later referred to as X, Y, and Z in the published dispatches. The French spokesmen, among other concessions, demanded an unneutral loan of 32 million florins, plus what amounted to a bribe of \$250,000, for the privilege of merely talking with Talleyrand.

These terms were intolerable. The American trio knew that bribes were standard diplomatic devices in Europe, but they gagged at paying a quarter of a million dollars for mere talk, without any assurances of a settlement. Negotiations quickly broke down, and John Marshall, on reaching New York in 1798, was hailed as a conquering hero for his steadfastness.

The **XYZ Affair** sent a wave of war hysteria sweeping through the United States, catching up even President Adams. The slogan of the hour became "Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute." The Federalists were delighted at this unexpected turn of affairs, whereas all except the most rabid Jeffersonians hung their heads in shame over the misbehavior of their French friends.

War preparations in the United States were pushed along at a feverish pace, despite considerable Jeffersonian opposition in Congress. The Navy Department was created; the three-ship navy was expanded; the United States Marine Corps was reestablished (originally created in 1775, the Marine Corps had been disbanded at the end of the Revolutionary War). A new

army of ten thousand men was authorized (but not fully raised).

Bloodshed was confined to the sea, and principally to the West Indies. In two and a half years of undeclared hostilities (1798–1800), American privateers and men-of-war of the new navy captured over eighty armed vessels flying the French colors, though several hundred Yankee merchant ships were lost to the enemy. Only a slight push, it seemed, might plunge both nations into a full-dress war.

★ Adams Puts Patriotism Above Party

Embattled France, its hands full in Europe, wanted no war. An outwitted Talleyrand realized that to fight the United States would merely add one more foe to his enemy roster. The British, who were lending the Americans cannon and other war supplies, were actually driven closer to their wayward cousins than they were to be again for many years. Talleyrand therefore let it be known, through roundabout channels, that if the Americans would send a new minister, he would be received with proper respect.

This French furor brought to Adams a degree of personal acclaim that he had never known before—and was never to know again. He doubtless perceived that a full-fledged war, crowned by the conquest of the Floridas and Louisiana, would bring new plaudits to the Federalist party—and perhaps a second term to himself. But the heady wine of popularity did not sway his

The firmness of President John Adams (1735–1826) was revealed in his message to Congress (June 1798):

“I will never send another minister to France without assurances that he will be received, respected, and honored as the representative of a great, free, powerful, and independent nation.”

final judgment. He, like other Founding Fathers, realized full well that war must be avoided while the country was relatively weak.

Adams unexpectedly exploded a bombshell when, early in 1799, he submitted to the Senate the name of a new minister to France. Hamilton and his war-hawk faction were enraged. But public opinion—Jeffersonian and reasonable Federalist alike—was favorable to one last try for peace.

America’s envoys (now three) found the political skies brightening when they reached Paris early in 1800. The ambitious “Little Corporal,” the Corsican Napoleon Bonaparte, had recently seized dictatorial power. He was eager to free his hands of the American squabble so that he might continue to redraw the map of Europe and perhaps create a New World empire in Louisiana. The afflictions and ambitions of the Old World were again working to America’s advantage.

After a great deal of haggling, a memorable treaty known as the **Convention of 1800** was signed in Paris. France agreed to annul the twenty-two-year-old marriage of (in)convenience, but as a kind of alimony the United States agreed to pay the damage claims of American shippers. So ended the nation’s only peacetime military alliance for a century and a half. Its troubled history does much to explain the traditional antipathy of the American people to foreign entanglements.

John Adams, flinty to the end, deserves immense credit for his belated push for peace, even though he was moved in part by jealousy of Hamilton. Adams not only avoided the hazards of war, but also unwittingly smoothed the path for the peaceful purchase of Louisiana three years later. He should indeed rank high among the forgotten purchasers of this vast domain. If America had drifted into a full-blown war with France in 1800, Napoleon would not have sold Louisiana to Jefferson on any terms in 1803.

President Adams, the bubble of his popularity pricked by peace, was aware of his signal contribution to the nation. He later suggested as the epitaph for his tombstone (not used), “Here lies John Adams, who took upon himself the responsibility of peace with France in the year 1800.”

The Federalist Witch Hunt

Exulting Federalists had meanwhile capitalized on the anti-French frenzy to drive through Congress in 1798 a sheaf of laws designed to muffle or minimize their Jeffersonian foes.

The first of these oppressive laws was aimed at supposedly pro-Jeffersonian “aliens.” Most European immigrants, lacking wealth, were scorned by the aristocratic Federalist party. But they were welcomed as voters by the less prosperous and more democratic Jeffersonians. The Federalist Congress, hoping to discourage the “dregs” of Europe, erected a disheartening barrier. They raised the residence requirements for aliens who desired to become citizens from a tolerable five years to an intolerable fourteen. This drastic new law violated the traditional American policy of open-door hospitality and speedy assimilation.

Two additional **Alien Laws** struck heavily at undesirable immigrants. The president was empowered to deport dangerous foreigners in time of peace and to deport or imprison them in time of hostilities. Though defensible as a war measure—and an officially declared war with France seemed imminent—this was an arbitrary grant of executive power contrary to American tradition and to the spirit of the Constitution, even though the stringent Alien Laws were never enforced.

The “lockjaw” **Sedition Act**, the last measure of the Federalist clampdown, was a direct slap at two priceless freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution by the Bill of Rights—freedom of speech and freedom of the press (First Amendment). This law provided that anyone who impeded the policies of the government or falsely defamed its officials, including the president, would be liable to a heavy fine and imprisonment. Severe though the measure was, the Federalists believed that it was justified. The verbal violence of the day was unrestrained, and foul-penned editors, some of them exiled aliens, vilified Adams’s anti-French policy in vicious terms.

Many outspoken Jeffersonian editors were indicted under the Sedition Act, and ten were brought to trial. All of them were convicted, often by packed juries swayed by prejudiced Federalist judges. Some of the victims were harmless partisans, who should have been spared the notoriety of martyrdom. Among them was Congressman Matthew Lyon (the “Spitting Lion”), who had earlier gained fame by spitting in the face of a Federalist. He was sentenced to four months in jail for writing of President Adams’s “unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, foolish adulation, and selfish avarice.” Another culprit was lucky to get off with a fine of \$100 after he had expressed the wish that the wad of a cannon fired in honor of Adams had landed in the seat of the president’s breeches.



Granger Collection

Congressional Pugilists
 Satirical representation of Matthew Lyon's fight in Congress with the Federalist representative Roger Griswold.

The Sedition Act seemed to be in direct conflict with the Constitution. But the Supreme Court, dominated by Federalists, was of no mind to declare this Federalist law unconstitutional. (The Federalists intentionally wrote the law to expire in 1801, so that it could not be used against them if they lost the next election.) This attempt by the Federalists to crush free speech and silence the opposition party, high-handed as it was, undoubtedly made many converts for the Jeffersonians.

Yet the Alien and Sedition Acts, despite pained outcries from the Jeffersonians they muzzled, commanded

widespread popular support. Anti-French hysteria played directly into the hands of witch-hunting conservatives. In the congressional elections of 1798–1799, the Federalists, riding a wave of popularity, scored the most sweeping victory of their entire history.

✦ The Virginia (Madison) and Kentucky (Jefferson) Resolutions

Resentful Jeffersonians naturally refused to take the Alien and Sedition Acts lying down. Jefferson himself feared that if the Federalists managed to choke free speech and free press, they would then wipe out other precious constitutional guarantees. His own fledgling political party might even be stamped out of existence. If this had happened, the country might have slid into a dangerous one-party dictatorship.

Fearing prosecution for sedition, Jefferson secretly penned a series of resolutions, which the Kentucky legislature approved in 1798 and 1799. His friend and fellow Virginian James Madison drafted a similar but less extreme statement, which was adopted by the legislature of Virginia in 1798.

Both Jefferson and Madison stressed the compact theory—a theory popular among English political philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As applied to America by the Jeffersonians, this concept meant that the thirteen sovereign states, in creating the federal government, had entered into a “compact,” or contract, regarding its jurisdiction. The national

In 1800 James Callender (1758–1803) published a pamphlet that assailed the president in strong language. For blasts like the following tirade, Callender was prosecuted under the Sedition Act, fined \$250, and sentenced to prison for nine months:

“The reign of Mr. Adams has, hitherto, been one continued tempest of *malignant* passions. As president, he has never opened his lips, or lifted his pen, without threatening and scolding. The grand object of his administration has been to exasperate the rage of contending parties, to calumniate and destroy every man who differs from his opinions. . . . Every person holding an office must either quit it, or think and vote exactly with Mr. Adams.”

government was consequently the agent or creation of the states. Since water can rise no higher than its source, the individual states were the final judges of whether their agent had broken the “compact” by overstepping the authority originally granted. Invoking this logic, Jefferson’s Kentucky resolutions concluded that the federal regime *had* exceeded its constitutional powers and that with regard to the Alien and Sedition Acts, “nullification”—a refusal to accept them—was the “rightful remedy.”

No other state legislatures, despite Jefferson’s hopes, fell into line. Some of them flatly refused to endorse the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions. Others, chiefly in Federalist states, added ringing condemnations. Many Federalists argued that the people, not the states, had made the original compact, and that it was up to the Supreme Court—not the states—to nullify unconstitutional legislation passed by Congress. This practice, though not specifically authorized by the Constitution, was finally adopted by the Supreme Court in 1803 (see pp. 208–210).

The **Virginia and Kentucky resolutions** were a brilliant formulation of the extreme states’ rights view regarding the Union—indeed more sweeping in their implications than their authors had intended. They were later used by southerners to support nullification—and ultimately secession. Yet neither Jefferson nor Madison, as Founding Fathers of the Union, had any intention of breaking it up; they were groping for ways to preserve it. Their resolutions were basically campaign documents designed to crystallize opposition

to the Federalist party and to unseat it in the upcoming presidential election of 1800. The only real nullification that Jefferson had in view was the nullification of Federalist abuses.

★ Federalists Versus Democratic-Republicans

As the presidential contest of 1800 approached, the differences between Federalists and Democratic-Republicans were sharply etched (see Table 10.3). As might be expected, most federalists of the pre-Constitution period (1787–1789) became Federalists in the 1790s. Largely welded by Hamilton into an effective group by 1793, they openly advocated rule by the “best people.” “Those who own the country,” remarked Federalist John Jay, “ought to govern it.” With their intellectual arrogance and Tory tastes, Hamiltonians distrusted full-blown democracy as the fountain of all mischiefs and feared the “swayability” of the untutored common folk.

Hamiltonian Federalists also advocated a strong central government with the power to crush democratic excesses like Shays’s Rebellion, protect the lives and estates of the wealthy, subordinate the sovereignty-loving states, and promote foreign trade. They believed that government should support private enterprise but not interfere with it. This attitude came naturally to the merchants, manufacturers, and shippers along the Atlantic seaboard, who made up the majority of

TABLE 10.3 The Two Political Parties, 1793–1800

Federalist Features	Democratic-Republican (Jeffersonian) Features
Rule by the “best people”	Rule by the informed masses
Hostility to extension of democracy	Friendliness toward extension of democracy
A powerful central government at the expense of states’ rights	A weak central government so as to preserve states’ rights
Loose interpretation of Constitution	Strict interpretation of Constitution
Government to foster business; concentration of wealth in interests of capitalistic enterprise	No special favors for business; agriculture preferred
A protective tariff	No special favors for manufacturers
Pro-British (conservative Tory tradition)	Pro-French (radical revolutionary tradition)
National debt a blessing, if properly funded	National debt a bane; rigid economy
An expanding bureaucracy	Reduction of federal officeholders
A powerful central bank	Encouragement to state banks
Restrictions on free speech and press	Relatively free speech and press
Concentration in seacoast area	Concentration in South and Southwest; in agricultural areas and backcountry
A strong navy to protect shippers	A minimal navy for coastal defense



Art Gallery, Williams Center, Lafayette College

Thomas Jefferson at Natural Bridge, by Caleb Boyle, ca. 1801 A great statesman, Jefferson wrote his own epitaph: “Here was buried Thomas Jefferson, Author of the Declaration of Independence, of the Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, and Father of the University of Virginia.”

Federalist support. Farther inland, few Hamiltonians dwelled.

The hinterland was largely anti-Federalist territory. Leading the anti-Federalists, who came eventually to be known as Democratic-Republicans or sometimes simply Republicans, was Thomas Jefferson. His rivalry with Hamilton defined the archetypal conflict in American political history. The two leaders appealed to different constituencies and expressed different theories of society, politics, and diplomacy.

Lanky and relaxed in appearance, lacking personal aggressiveness, weak-voiced, and unable to deliver a rabble-rousing speech, Jefferson became a master political organizer through his ability to lead people rather than drive them. His strongest appeal was to the middle class and to the underprivileged—the

“dirt” farmers, the laborers, the artisans, and the small shopkeepers.

Liberal-thinking Jefferson, with his aristocratic head set on a farmer’s frame, was a bundle of inconsistencies. By one set of tests, he should have been a Federalist, for he was a Virginia aristocrat and slaveowner who lived in an imposing hilltop mansion at Monticello. A so-called traitor to his own upper class, Jefferson cherished uncommon sympathy for the common people, especially the downtrodden, the oppressed, and the persecuted. As he wrote in 1800, “I have sworn upon the altar of God eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man.”

Jeffersonian Republicans demanded a weak central regime. They believed that the best government was the one that governed least. The bulk of the power, Jefferson argued, should be retained by the states. There the people, in intimate contact with local affairs, could keep a more vigilant eye on their public servants. Otherwise a dictatorship might develop. Central authority—a kind of necessary evil—was to be kept at a minimum through a strict interpretation of the Constitution. The national debt, which he saw as a curse illegitimately bequeathed to later generations, was to be paid off.

Jeffersonian Republicans, themselves primarily agrarians, insisted that there should be no special privileges for special classes, particularly manufacturers. Agriculture, to Jefferson, was the favored branch of the economy and formed the foundation of his political thought. “Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God,” he said. Most of his followers naturally came from the agricultural South and Southwest.

Above all, Jefferson advocated the rule of the people. But he did not propose thrusting the ballot into the hands of *every* adult white male. He favored government *for* the people, but not by *all* the people—only by those white men who were literate enough to inform themselves and wear the mantle of American citizenship worthily. Universal education would have

Thomas Jefferson’s vision of a republican America was peopled with virtuous farmers, not factory hands. As early as 1784, he wrote,

“While we have land to labor then, let us never wish to see our citizens occupied at a workbench, or twirling a distaff. . . . For the general operations of manufacture, let our workshops remain in Europe. . . . The mobs of great cities add just so much to the support of pure government, as sores do to the strength of the human body.”

to precede universal suffrage. The ignorant, he argued, were incapable of self-government. But he had profound faith in the reasonableness and teachableness of the masses and in their collective wisdom when taught.

Landlessness among American citizens threatened popular democracy as much as illiteracy, in Jefferson's eyes. He feared that propertyless dependents would be political pawns in the hands of their landowning superiors. How could the emergence of a landless class of voters be avoided? The answer, in part, was by slavery. A system of black slave labor in the South ensured that white yeoman farmers could remain independent landowners. Without slavery, poor whites would have to provide the cheap labor so necessary for the cultivation of tobacco and rice, and their low wages would preclude their ever owning property. Jefferson thus tortuously reconciled slaveholding—his own included—with his more democratic impulses.

Yet for his time, Jefferson's confidence that white, free men could become responsible and knowledgeable citizens was open-minded. He championed their freedom of speech, for without free speech, the misdeeds of tyranny could not be exposed. Jefferson even dared to say that given the choice of "a government without newspapers" and "newspapers without a government," he would opt for the latter. Yet no other American leader, except perhaps Abraham Lincoln, ever suffered more foul abuse from editorial pens; Jefferson might well have prayed for freedom *from* the Federalist press.

Differences over foreign policy defined another sharp distinction between Hamilton and Jefferson.

Hamilton looked outward and eastward. He sought to build a strong national state that would assert and expand America's commercial interests. "No Government could give us tranquility and happiness at home," he declared, "which did not possess sufficient stability and strength to make us respectable abroad." Foreign trade, especially with Britain, was a key cog in Hamilton's fiscal machinery, and friendship with Britain was thus indispensable. Jeffersonian Republicans, unlike the Federalist "British boot-lickers," were basically pro-French. They earnestly believed that it was America's advantage to support the liberal ideals of the French Revolution, rather than applaud the reaction of the British Tories. Jefferson, in effect, faced inward and westward. His priorities were to protect and strengthen democracy at home, especially in the frontier regions beyond the Appalachians, rather than flex America's muscles abroad.

So as the young Republic's first full decade of nationhood came to a close, the Founders' hopes seemed already imperiled. Conflicts over domestic politics and foreign policy undermined the unity of the Revolutionary era and called into question the very viability of the American experiment in democracy. As the presidential election of 1800 approached, the danger loomed that the fragile and battered American ship of state, like many another before it and after it, would founder on the rocks of controversy. The shores of history are littered with the wreckage of nascent nations torn asunder before they could grow to a stable maturity. Why should the United States expect to enjoy a happier fate?

Chapter Review

KEY TERMS

Bill of Rights (182)	Fallen Timbers, Battle of (191)
Judiciary Act of 1789 (182)	Greenville, Treaty of (191)
funding at par (183)	Jay's Treaty (193)
assumption (183)	Pinckney's Treaty (193)
tariff (184)	Farewell Address (193)
excise tax (184)	XYZ Affair (195)
Bank of the United States (185)	Convention of 1800 (196)
Whiskey Rebellion (185)	Alien Laws (196)
Reign of Terror (190)	Sedition Act (196)
Neutrality Proclamation (190)	Virginia and Kentucky resolutions (198)

PEOPLE TO KNOW

George Washington	"Mad Anthony" Wayne
Alexander Hamilton	John Jay
Louis XVI	John Adams
Edmond Genêt	Charles Maurice de Talleyrand
Little Turtle	

CHRONOLOGY

1789	Constitution formally put into effect Judiciary Act of 1789 Washington elected president French Revolution begins Declaration of the Rights of Man (France)	1794	Whiskey Rebellion Battle of Fallen Timbers Jay's Treaty with Britain
1790	First official census	1795	Treaty of Greenville: Indians cede Ohio Pinckney's Treaty with Spain
1791	Bill of Rights adopted Vermont becomes fourteenth state Bank of the United States created Excise tax passed	1796	Washington's Farewell Address
1792	Washington reelected president	1797	Adams becomes president XYZ Affair
1792–1793	Federalist and Democratic-Republican parties formed	1798	Alien and Sedition Acts
1793	Louis XVI beheaded; radical phase of French Revolution France declares war on Britain and Spain Washington's Neutrality Proclamation Citizen Genêt affair	1798–1799	Virginia and Kentucky resolutions
		1798–1800	Undeclared war with France
		1800	Convention of 1800: peace with France

TO LEARN MORE

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A complete, annotated bibliography for this chapter—along with brief descriptions of the People to Know—may be found on the American Pageant website. The Key Terms are defined in a Glossary at the end of the text.



Go to the CourseMate website at www.cengagebrain.com for additional study tools and review materials—including audio and video clips—for this chapter.

AP* Review Questions for Chapter 10

- All of the following are true statements about the Bill of Rights EXCEPT that it
 - is the first ten amendments to the Constitution.
 - gives to the federal government all powers not specifically designated in the Constitution.
 - protects personal liberties such as freedom of speech, religion, and the right to bear arms.
 - was added at the insistence of, and as a compromise with, anti-Federalists.
 - prevents the government from arbitrarily seizing private property.
- Why did Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton want the federal government to assume state debts accumulated during the American Revolution?
 - He hoped to end the practice of speculating.
 - He supported fiscal policies that aided the masses.
 - He wanted to prove the federal treasury was solid enough to handle the debt.
 - He hoped to shift wealthy creditors' obligations and allegiances from the states to the federal government.
 - He wanted to put the new republic on more solid financial ground.
- Leaders chose a site along the Potomac River for the nation's capitol city (ultimately, Washington, D.C.) in 1790 because
 - it was centrally located between northern and southern states.
 - it was close to the homes of several leaders, including President George Washington and Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson.
 - it would ensure that Virginia would vote in favor of Hamilton's plan for federal assumption of state war debts.
 - its strategic location would ensure the collection of customs and duties needed to pay down the national debt.
 - its river location made it easily accessible by various transportation routes.
- Which of the following was NOT part of Hamilton's economic program for the new nation?
 - Protecting well-to-do manufacturing interests
 - Establishing a national bank
 - Setting an excise tax
 - Limiting the power of the central government
 - Creating a sound monetary policy
- The "loose construction" interpretation of the Constitution refers to the notion that
 - in carrying out its duties, the central government can take any measure not specifically prohibited by the Constitution.
 - all powers not expressly given to the central government belong to the states.
 - the judiciary branch should be the final voice in interpreting the law.
 - Congress may pass only those laws and take only those actions deemed necessary to conduct the business of the United States.
 - the central government can only act as defined by the Constitution.
- The Whiskey Rebellion is most significant because
 - it marked the first tax rebellion against the new republic.
 - distillers were successful in their push to have the government repeal its tax on whiskey.
 - it included many former veterans of the American Revolution.
 - it was the first protest to make its case without violence.
 - it led to the strengthening and increased credibility of Washington's government.
- Which were the first two political parties in America?
 - Federalists and anti-Federalists
 - National Republicans and Democratic Republicans
 - Democratic-Republicans and Federalists
 - Whigs and Tories
 - Democrats and Whigs
- What was the main reason that leaders in the newly formed United States were suspicious of the formation of political parties?
 - They feared such divisiveness might trigger another revolution.
 - They were not accustomed to the long-term existence of political parties.
 - They considered sustained opposition to government antithetical to unity and the functioning of a republic.
 - They believed parties to be seedbeds of corruption.
 - They worried that party politics would interfere with the functioning of government.

9. George Washington's 1793 Neutrality Proclamation in the conflict between France and England is significant for all of the following reasons EXCEPT that it
- launched America's isolationist foreign policy tradition.
 - was based on an accurate assessment of America's military and diplomatic strengths and weaknesses.
 - marked a departure from the Franco-American Alliance of 1778.
 - united Federalists and Jeffersonians around a single cause.
 - actually served the French more than American entry into the war might have.
10. Which of these was NOT among the many responses to Jay's Treaty with Britain in 1794?
- Outrage by southerners, Jeffersonians, and the French
 - A surge in President Washington's popularity
 - Increased interest by Spain in a treaty of its own with America
 - Mob riots and demonstrations
 - Britain agreeing to pay damages for seizing American ships
11. Americans were angered by the XYZ Affair with France because
- they likened it to a bribe rather than respectable diplomacy.
 - the French refused to compensate American merchants for goods seized in their ships.
 - the French diplomatic minister sent American ambassadors home.
 - French importers had blocked American commerce from entering Europe.
 - French officials arrested America's diplomatic envoy John Marshall.
12. What move did John Adams make in 1800 that paved the way for the Louisiana Purchase in 1803?
- He launched a crucial military battle that led to victory against French leader Napoleon Bonaparte.
 - He accepted a second invitation to negotiate a treaty with the French.
 - He authorized the government purchase of foreign land bordering American states.
 - He joined forces with the British against France.
 - He moved to purchase Florida from the Spanish.
13. The Alien and Sedition laws were intended to accomplish all of the following EXCEPT
- silence critics of the Federalist government.
 - target immigrant voters.
 - grant the president the right to deport foreigners.
 - boost the power and popularity of Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans.
 - raise residency requirements for citizenship.
14. What was the most fundamental difference between the Federalist party and the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans?
- Jeffersonians felt that only the talented elite should lead; Federalists embraced the masses.
 - Federalists tended to be located along the Atlantic seaboard; Jeffersonians inhabited rural and back-country regions.
 - Jeffersonians tended to be slaveowners; Federalists were largely opposed to slavery.
 - Federalists embraced commercial interests; Jeffersonians saw farming as the hallmark of the nation's economy.
 - Federalists advocated for a strong central government; Jeffersonians promoted states' rights.
15. Why did Thomas Paine declare, "The principles of America opened the Bastille"?
- Both revolutions were built upon the ideals of liberty and equality.
 - America and France went through period of intense violence after their revolutions.
 - Both revolutions immediately produced strong, powerful leaders.
 - Americans' refusal to adhere to their alliance with France sparked a long, deadly war.
 - Both nations were spurred to action because the mother country levied unfair taxes.
16. Events in Europe drew the United States into world affairs in all of the following ways EXCEPT that
- British naval practices in the West Indies led to the extremely unpopular Jay's Treaty.
 - The prospect of an Anglo-American alliance frightened Spain, leading to Pinckney's Treaty.
 - Improved relations with Britain led to the XYZ Affair and the buildup of the navy.
 - Napoleon's quest for European domination led to the end of the Franco-American alliance.
 - British and French impressments led to an era of complete isolation in the United States.